I am a researcher at the Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, CNR, in Rome. You can look at my publications, or at my curriculum vitae, or contact me: giovanni.pezzulo(AT)istc.cnr.it I got a degree in Philosophy of Science and a PhD in Cognitive Psychology. My interests are both theoretical and computational, with several topics: anticipation and anticipatory behavior (in the framework of the EU funded project MindRACES); cognitive architectures (trying to bridge sensorimotor interaction with high-level cognitive capabilities such as practical reasoning); goal-oriented behavior; representations (theoretical and computational models); motivations (and their roles in determining behavior); decision making (theoretical and computational models, some experimental work).

Tuesday 6 February 2007

Toward a Perceptual Symbol System

This is my first attempt to simulate some aspects of Barsalou's perceptual symbol system theory.

Abstract: We explore the possibility for a situated system to evolve what Barsalou calls a perceptual symbol system (PSS). We describe the peculiarities of perceptual symbols and point out the main capabilities of organized, multimodal frames of perceptual symbols called simulators. We present a case study in which perceptual symbols and simulators are evolved and exploited for categorization, prediction and abstraction.

Pezzulo, G. & Calvi, G. Toward a Perceptual Symbol System Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference on Epigenetic Robotics: Modeling Cognitive Development in Robotic Systems, Lund University Cognitive Science Studies 118, 2006

DiPRA: Distributed Practical Reasoning Architecture

This is my first simulative work describing how to extend a sensorimotor system to include elements of high-level cognition.

Abstract: DiPRA (Distributed Practical Reasoning Architecture) implements the main principles of practical reasoning via the distributed action selection paradigm. We introduce and motivate the underlying theoretical and computational peculiarities of DiPRA and we describe its components, also providing as a case study a guards-and-thieves task.

Pezzulo, G.; Calvi, G. & Castelfranchi, C. DiPRA: Distributed Practical Reasoning Architecture Proceedings of the Twentieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2007, 1458-1464

Dynamic Computation and Context Effects in the Hybrid Architecture AKIRA

A discussion of the principles of the framework AKIRA, also comparing it with related models such as Hofstadter's Copycat

Abstract: We present AKIRA, an agent-based hybrid architecture designed for cognitive modeling. We describe some of the underlying ideas motivating its development, such as the possibility of exploiting distributed representations and performing parallel, dynamic and context aware computation. We illustrate its main components and capabilities and compare it with some related cognitive architectures, such as DUAL and Copycat. We present also a sample simulation in the visual search domain, exploiting AKIRA’s peculiarities for cognitive modeling.

Pezzulo, G. & Calvi, G. Dynamic Computation and Context Effects in the Hybrid Architecture AKIRA Modeling and Using Context: 5th International and Interdisciplinary Conference CONTEXT 2005, Springer LNAI 3554., 2005, 368-381

A Schema Based Model of the Praying Mantis

My first simulative work about the integration of a sensorimotor system with a simple motivational system, inspired by ethology

Abstract. We present a schema-based agent architecture which is inspired by an ethological model of the praying mantis. It includes an inner state, perceptual and motor schemas, several routines, a fovea and a motor. We describe the design and implementation of the architecture and we use it for comparing two models: the former uses reactive, stimulus-response schemas; the latter involves also forward models, which are used by the schemas for generating predictions. Our results show an advantage in using anticipatory components inside the schemas.

Pezzulo, G. & Calvi, G. A Schema Based Model of the Praying Mantis LNAI, From animals to animats 9: Proceedings of the Ninth International Conference on Simulation of Adaptive Behaviour, Springer Verlag, 2006, LNAI 4095, 211-223

Monday 5 February 2007

anticipatory emotions

[...] embodied systems receive information also from their body and can use this input for an emotional control of their autonomous behaviour. The project will focus on the role of anticipatory emotions such as fear, hope, anxiety in integration with other domains of functioning (Motivation, Cognition, Behaviour) and more generally on the anticipatory character of the emotional response [...]

surprise

'Surprise' is the automatic reaction to a mismatch. It is: 1) a (felt) reaction/response; 2) of alert and arousal; 3) due to an inconsistency (mismatch, non-assimilation, lack of integration) between incoming information and our previous knowledge, in particular an actual prediction or a potential prediction; 4) invoking and mobilizing resources at disposal of an activity for a better epistemic processing of this 'strange' information (attention, search, belief revision, etc.), but also for coping with the potential 'threat'; 5) aimed at solving the inconsistency; 6) and at preventing possible dangers (the reason for the alarm) due to a lack of predictability and to a wrong anticipation.

structure and evolution of anticipatory representations and mechanisms

there are many kinds of anticipatory representations and mechanisms, having multiple roles and features. we want to focus on how it is possible to pass from the less complex to the more complex ones in biological and simulated systems; and on the relationships between anticipatory representations and mechanisms

constructive perception and abduction

Constructive perception is focused on high-level perception where the sensorial stimulation is structured or organized through the application of schemas (recognition). The percepts are constructed through the schematization of the sensorial stimulation (sensations). The schemes are seen as procedures to construct and interpret the percepts. The sensorial stimulation is seen as a "sign" of the percept that the cognitive system has the goal to construct. The cognitive system sees the sensorial stimulation as a token of a specific type (or schema) and in this sense guesses what there is out there, makes hypothesis (to be verified) about the reality. The interpretation of the sensorial stimuli is then oriented by the already available schemas for interpretation that influences the way in which new information is gathered and actively pursued (epistemic actions) to fill such schemas. Besides the schema activates more knowledge of the object than what is present in the current stimulation. In front of an apple, the cognitive system sees it as an apple beginning from a particular stimulation i.e. by focusing on its shape and color. Emphasis is given also to the influence of top-down influences in perception (background assumptions, active pragmatic goals, external context).

goal orientedness: from intentions to actions

How it is possible to pass from intentional deliberation of action to its realization? which are the mechanisms involved?

epistemic actions, monitoring and control

Epistemic Actions are actions aimed at acquiring new information from the environment usually through the shift of the attentional focus and its fixation which determines what the cognitive system will perceive. Epistemic Controls are specific actions aimed at checking whether the expected events or results are already realized

epistemic actions, monitoring and control

Epistemic Actions are actions aimed at acquiring new information from the environment usually through the shift of the attentional focus and its fixation which determines what the cognitive system will perceive. Epistemic Controls are specific actions aimed at checking whether the expected events or results are already realized

the kinds and roles of anticipations; implicit and explicit anticipations

Any purposive behavior (in strict sense), any goal-directed system is necessarily anticipatory, since it is driven by the representation of the goal-state (set-point) and activated by its mismatch with the current state of the world. But not any anticipatory behavior, and even not necessarily any behavior based on anticipatory representations is goal-directed. Not any anticipatory behavior is based on explicit cognitive representations of future relevant/concerning events, that is on expectations.

what is anticipation?

Expectation is an ambiguous word. Sometimes it coincides with hope (or fear), sometimes with forecast, and sometimes it implies both. NOT just a simple forecast or prediction that can be defined as a belief that a certain future event p is (more or less) probable, and it involves no necessary personal concern or goal about p. By expectation we mean an internally represented wish or goal about a future event together with the belief that the (un)desired outcome is possible or (more or less) probable.

MindRACES: my EU-funded project

Currently I work in the framework of MindRACES: from Reactive to Anticipatory Cognitive Embodied Systems. It is a three-year EC funded project (Sixth Framework Programme - Information Society and Technologies - Cognitive Systems) involving 8 Partners. It is mainly focused on the concept of Anticipation. Our aim is (1) to theoretically understand anticipation and anticipatory behavior, and (2) to endow artificial systems such as robots with future-oriented capabilities.

The framework AKIRA

Since 2003 Gianguglielmo Calvi and I have been developing a computational system called AKIRA It is an open-source project, developed under sourceforge sourceforge and it permits to implement modular systems. We have used AKIRA for designing and implementing several cognitive systems, that have all the same underlying design philosophy -behavior and cognition arise from "the competition and cooperation among multiple concurrent processes", as we think that it is the case in the brain, much in the spirit of Marvin Minsky's Society of Mind.

My work at the Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies in Rome

Currently I work at the >Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, CNR, in Rome.

I got a degree in Philosophy of Science and a PhD in Cognitive Psychology. My interests are both theoretical and computational, with several topics: anticipation and anticipatory behavior (in the framework of the EU funded project MindRACES); cognitive architectures (trying to bridge sensorimotor interaction with high-level cognitive capabilities such as practical reasoning); goal-oriented behavior; representations (theoretical and computational models); motivations (and their roles in determining behavior); decision making (theoretical and computational models, some experimental work).

You can look at my publications in my webpage at ISTC-CNR.